Abstract. This article explores five strong beliefs, or myths, held by Americans about the British National Health Service: (1) the NHS is socialized medicine; (2) widespread rationing occurs; (3) NHS patients have to face long waiting times; (4) the NHS does not offer free choice of provider; and (5) private medicine is taking over. The authors explore how ethnocentricity and American values have shaped these five myths, and argue that these cultural biases limit the ability of Americans to objectively evaluate the NHS and prevent them from learning from the British system.
Introduction
For two years the senior author was a visiting member of the University of Minnesota's Hospital and Healthcare Administration Program and the Center for Health Services Research. During that time he met hundreds of students, health service professionals, academics, and U, S. citizens. Once they discovered he was a British hospital administrator and academician, they wanted to talk about "SOcialized medicine ." From these discussions, it became apparent that Americans commonly have strong beliefs about the British National Health Service (NHS). These beliefs are based upon preconceptions and assumed characteristics of the NHS. While these preconceived ideas are limited in number, they do shape the way Americans view and evaluate the NHS. Five myths commonly held by Americans about the British National Health Service will be explored in this paper.
Why evaluate these myths? The authors believe the British NHS offers a far better model for providing a population (and its individual members) with modem health care, in terms of cost, equity of access, and quality, than Americans are willing to admit. The purpose of this paper is not to argue that the British NHS is better than the American health care system. Nor is the purpose to argue that a system such as the NHS would work in the U.S . Rather, the purpose is to broaden petitive during the 1980s, the quantity and quality of comparative health systems research waned as the similarity of the American system with other national systems declined. In addition, the current revolution in the U.S. health care systemnew financing incentives, the evolution of providers such as HMOs, and the devaluation of the American physician-has turned researchers from an external comparative focus to an internal system analysis focus. Thus, comparative health services research by Americans has suffered in recent years. The reduction in empirical data comparing the system performance has resulted in attitudes developing based less on facts and more on myths among academics and the public alike.
American comparative researchers have long been interested in comparing the U.S. system to that of the U.K. Odin Anderson chose to compare the U.S. system to both the Swedish and British health care systems (Anderson 1975) ; Victor and Ruth Sidel examined the U.S. and British systems along with three other national systems (Sidel and Sidel 1977) ; and, most recently, Aaron and Schwartz compared British and American hospital and technological utilization rates (Aaron and Schwartz 1984) . Researchers cite the comparable cultures, the success of the British at containing costs, and the notable equity of care in the British system as the reasons for this comparison. Often American researchers explain the British support of the NHS as the result of ethnocentricity: "British citizens, however, compare availability of care with what they had before, not with the standards of other countries; and the continued visits from wealthy foreigners to secure treatment showed them that Britain provided some of the best health services in the world" one of those phrases that conveys cultural values and seems to elicit a knee-jerk response from many Americans. The senior author had never heard this phrase before he visited the United States. Americans do not ask a British visitor about the National Health Service; instead, they inquire about the quality of care under socialized medicine.
The term socialized medicine has been a highly effective banner word for American opponents of both a national health system and national health insurance. Ever since the New York Times (1932) headlined its front-page story on the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, "Socialized Medicine is Urged in Survey," this term has been used to refer to increased governmental intervention in the provision of health care. Indeed, it is true that the Socialists in 1904 were the first American political party to endorse health insurance. However, according to the typology of health systems developed by Field (1976) the U.K.'s NHS differs from socialized medicine in several dimensions. Most notably, the fact that British health care is a state-supported consumer good, with both public and private ownership of facilities and fairly strong professional associations, distinguishes the NHS from truly socialized systems such as the U.S.S.R.'s. Although academic researchers appreciate the organizational, economic, and political aspects of a national health service versus socialized medicine, most Americans do not. Is there any basis for the American tagging of the British NHS as socialized medicine?
First, one obvious rationale for the term is that the NHS was originated by the British Socialist party, more commonly known in the U.S. as the Labour party. Although the Labour party does all it can to perpetuate the notion of parental responsibility, the groundwork for the NHS had actually been laid three decades earlier. Liberal Prime Minister Lloyd George forced through the 1911 National Insurance Act to cover manual workers up to a certain income. The administrative and financial arrangements for general practice established in 1911 preserved general practice and established an amenable framework for the NHS . Labour Minister Aneurin Bevan actually is credited with making enough concessions to preserve private practice that the British Medical Association finally supported the enactment of the National Health Service in 1946.
It is well established on both sides of the Atlantic that the NHS was the product of a variety of political, economic, technological, and social developments over half a century which involved all three political parties, the health care professions, and various other interested parties (e. g . , Friendly Societies, municipal authorities, and the insurance industry) (Eckstein 1964; Klein 1983b) . Far from being strictly a socialist development, socialist and trade union thinkers and politicians had given very little thought to a national health service before WWII. They considered ill health to be a product of poor housing, poor education, and low wages. If these primary ills were corrected, illness would be eradicated. During World War 11, socialist physicians were successful in convincing the politicians and other activist groups that the attitude that social conditions strictly determined health status was naive.
Instead of being considered a socialist demand for free health care as a "right" of citizenship, the NHS was actually an exercise in paternalistic social engineering by Conservatives and Liberals (Klein 1983a) . The NHS was predicated on the assumption that it would make the workforce healthier and therefore increase national productivity. Not only would such a system improve the economy, but it would also gradually cost less because illness was viewed as a residual category that could be eradicated. In fact, the enormous hidden demand for health care services and the related costs shocked politicians of all parties. The U. S . , of course, discovered the same hidden demand for health services among the general population twenty years later, after the passage of Medicare and Medicaid.
Second, the use of the term socialized medicine might be justified because all health services in the U.K. are "nationalized." The fact that most hospitals, clinics, ambulances, and laboratories are owned by the government (or the people, depending on your rhetoric) was not a feature originally planned by the Beveridge report, the document accepted by the government in 1943 which outlined the framework for the NHS. The rationale for hospital nationalization was to gain some control over both the hospital-based specialists and the nonhospital-based general practitioners in order to limit the use of hospital services.
The nationalization was not, however, the blow against free enterprise that might be supposed by most American observers. Approximately 2,000 hospitals were nationalized, but another 200 remained private. The latter were mostly small hospitals run by religious organizations, particularly orders of Roman Catholic nuns. The majority of hospitals in Britain in the 1940s had been built either by voluntary groups who relied on public contributions and government contracts and grants or by local government authorities. In reality, the change in ownership was less a nationalization and more a rationalization to encourage regional planning and control of services.
Third, because the term socialized is defined as "state-provided," a third justification for the term is that all NHS staff, including physicians, became salaried with the implementation of the NHS. Most staff, including hospital specialists, are salaried. Specialists with full-time contracts may not practice privately, but many have part-time contracts and do, in fact, have private practice incomes. General practitioner physicians, dentists, opticians, and nonhospital-based pharmacists, if they work for the NHS, are reimbursed by a formula based on a base salary, per capita payment, and items-of-service payments.
It is interesting to note that the ownership of facilities and employment of staff in medicine is considered socialistic whereas the same type of ownership and employment apparent in the American public school systems, parks, and roads is not labeled socialistic, Why do the American political, economic, and cultural values accept government intervention in one public good and not another? Americans do not call their own systems "socialized schools" or "socialized roads," yet that is the label given to the parallel NHS system. Fourth, the term socialized medicine is often used to refer to any health care services not paid on a fee-for-service basis by individuals. Roemer (1982: 5) used the term this way in referring to the U.S. health care system: Over the last half century, the sources of funds for the health sector have become increasingly social. Thus, 50 years ago more than 80 percent of all money spent in the health sector came from private individuals, the balance coming from government, charity, insurance or other social sources. As per capita GNP has enlarged, a rising proportion of health related spending has been mobilized through social or collective mechanisms. . . . In a crude sense, therefore, so far as financial support is concerned, U.S. health care has already become two-thirds "socialized," in spite of the great strength in the U.S. economy as a whole.
Despite these four possible rationales for the use of the term socialized medicine to refer to Britain's NHS, the characteristics of a socialized health care system are not fulfilled. Clearly, state provision of services or true socialized medicine challenges all three of Dolbeare's American values: individualism, property, and the free market. Given the misleading implications associated with the term sucialized medicine, substituting the term nationalized health care to refer to the British NHS might allow Americans to evaluate the system more objectively.
Myth two: Widespread rationing occurs in the NHS
Immediately after you begin to discuss the NHS, Americans want to know, "But don't you have rationing?" Basic economic theory explains that whenever a commodity is finite and demand exceed supply, rationing occurs. Because of Americans' belief in the free market system, rationing by price is not considered rationing. However, any mechanism that controls access to a commodity or service is rationing. The real issue is not whether rationing occurs, but the appropriateness of the mechanism, the quality of the outcomes, and who makes the decisions. As Paton (1986) 
Rationing by "people" as opposed to rationing by "type of service" is more common in the U.S. than in Britain. In the United States, government programs (mainly working through public finance, but not public provision) have been a partial alternative to the inequities of the market. Yet the ethos of the market in health care is so strong that, when equity and cost control collide, equity tends to lose out. "Whether or not you have the cash" is the criterion for rationing U.S.-style, rather than whether or not the government thinks the treatment in question is worth providing. Aaron and Schwartz's (1984) examination of the rationing of hospital services fueled the myth that widespread rationing occurs in the U.K. In order to fairly evaluate the degree of rationing that occurs, the total range of services provided by the NHS must be examined. Health care provided by the NHS can be divided into six broad categories:
. Health education and prevention. Individual and community-based provision of information about avoiding ill health and promoting healthy lifestyles; vac-cinations and drugs for infants, children and adults; and physical check-ups, including dental and ophthalmic check-ups. All these services are provided free. Primary care. Services provided by physicians, dentists, and other health professionals without the need for referral for specialist attention or diagnostic procedures only available in hospitals. Secondary care. The broad range of specialist hospital services provided in response to acute or severe physical and psychiatric illness. Tertiary care. Specialist care provided in regional centers of expertise. Services not routinely provided, services requiring expensive technology, and services infrequently required are provided in such centers. Long-term care for the chronically handicapped. Services provided for those who are congenitally disabled or disabled by accident or disease. Long-term care for the aged. Aged population services, particularly where families are broken up or smaller than in past generations. The base array of services provided by the N H S must be considered in order to focus on the charges of widespread rationing. This array of services provided by the N H S contrasts with the U.S. health care system, which is generally considered to consist of hospitals and doctors' offices.
For example, American do not normally consider physician services to be rationed. Yet, in an ABC News-Washington Post poll conducted in October 1985, 24 percent of the respondents indicated that they had no regular doctor. Every British citizen is assigned a regular physician. To the British, limiting access to primary services according to ability to pay would be considered rationing of care.
In the same poll, 23 percent of the respondents indicated that they did not have enough insurance benefits to get the health and medical care they needed. Again, British citizens are differentiated in that their insurance coverage provides access to care for all.
Even under the culturally biased and economically incorrect assumption that rationing under the NHS is rationing whereas restricting access according to price or ability of pay is not rationing, many Americans are in favor of rationing. In a survey of 1,007 Americans conducted by the American Board of Family Practice in January 1985, the public and physicians supported limited availability to care under some circumstances (see Table 1 ). Aaron and Schwartz (1984: 11) stated that they published The Painful Prescription to "use the British experience as the basis for drawing inferences about how Americans would respond should they undertake to sharply reduce growth of medical spending." Yet their bias was just as ethnocentric as that of the citizens who ask about socialized medicine. First, Aaron and Schwartz only chose to study access to capital-intensive medical procedures. Thus, access to primary care services such as home care, vaccinations, or health education was not considered. Second, as stated on page 7, For most procedures we use the level of services in the United States as a measure of the treatment that would result if all care expected to generate net medical benefits were provided. . . , The norm for hospital care in the United States approximates the maxim "if it will help, do it." . . . Thus, care in the United States is usually close to what would be provided if cost were no object and benefit to patients were the sole concern.
of course, this rationale ignores the often-studied unequal access to care in the U.S. based on race, age, gender, income, and education. Finally, Aaron and Schwartz briefly mention measures of outcome related to health status, but never emphasize them. Why? Because, as all health services researchers and most Americans know, high-technology services have a much less significant impact on morbidity and mortality than lifestyle. Table 2 presents both outcome and health care resources comparisons between the U.K. and the U.S. Of interest is the fact that there is no significant difference between the two countries in life expectancy for men and women, infant mortality, or perinatal mortality, despite the fact that in 1984 the U.K. spent 6.2 percent of its GNP on health care while the U.S. spent 10.8 percent of its GNP. Diffusion of technology is a complex issue-especially in medicine. As Doessel (1986) summarized, "First, there is the issue of efficacy andlor safety. Second, there are various ethical and legal issues that are raised by technological change in medicine. The third major dimension is the relationship between technology and the diffusion of innovations and expenditures for health services ." Nonetheless, Aaron and Schwartz attempted to examine the level of provision, which is a factor of technology adoption, of ten therapeutic procedures. Hemophilia treatment, megavoltage therapy, and bone marrow transplantation were provided at essentially the same level in the U.K. as in the U.S.; however, seven other services were "clearly rationed in Britain when compared with the same frequency per capita in Britain as in the United States" (Aaron and Schwartz 1984: 28) .
Since the publication of the research by Aaron and Schwartz in 1984, the reimbursement system in the U. S . has clearly created incentives for American hospitals and physicians to reduce the use of capital-intensive procedures. Paton (1986: 254) argues that increased pressure on the health care budgets in both the old "progressive coalitions" has caused the systems in both countries to converge. Thus, some of the procedures Aaron and Schwartz discussed will be reexamined to evaluate the myth that rationing occurs in the U.K. for selected services but not in the U.S. However, it must be noted before continuing that in order to determine if rationing is occurring in either country, two conditions must be met. First, the medical treatment must be proven to be beneficial to the patient. Second, these treatments must be denied to patients. Varying levels of utilization do not in and of themselves prove either case.
Renal dialysis. Differential access to hemodialysis by persons suffering from end-stage renal disease (ESRD) has been extensively studied. As Marine and Simmons (1986) stated, "The contrast provided by ESRD treatment symbolizes macrolevel differences in the culture of the two countries." Although the ESRD programs in the U.S. and the U.K. are quite different, it is clear that they are consistent with the larger economic context in both countries. Table 3 compares the utilization rates and cost of transplantation and dialysis in both countries.
The larger cost differential between home and hospital dialysis in the U.K. provides a greater incentive for home dialysis than in the U.S., regardless of explicit national policy. Home dialysis generally improves quality of care for the patient, reduces total treatment cost, and is the preferred treatment mode for most patients. However, the minimal cost differential in the U.S. has not stimulated patients to pursue this option when total treatment cost is covered through the Medicare program for all ESRD patients. In addition, hospitals have had a financial incentive to retain ESRD patients rather than prepare them for home dialysis. However, the fact that the treatment modality in the U.S. is driven by financial incentives rather than quality of care is rarely discussed by American authors. For example, attention has rarely focused on the higher rate of transplantation in the U.K. than in the U.S. Americans envision that rationing specifically occurs for high-technology services, such as transplants. Actually, the transplantation payback period for an ESRD patient in the U.K. is nine weeks, whereas the payback period for a U. S . ESRD patient is 40 weeks. Rather than focus on the higher quality of life provided to ESRD patients after a transplant or on home dialysis in the U.K., attention has focused on the U.K. policies regarding hemodialysis, particularly with regard to the elderly (Halper 1985) . Table 3 that a wide disparity exists between the level of ESRD treatment in the U.S. and U.K. However, accurate information regarding the appropriate level of hemodialysis in either population group is not available. With regard to technological intervention, the level of appropriate care remains to be determined.
It is clear from
First, it must be clarified that the U.K. does not have an explicit policy on the provision of hemodialysis to the aged or any other segment of the population. Policy decisions are implicitly made based on budget allocations. Hospital administrators in the U.S. are making the same types of implicit rationing decisions when they eliminate unprofitable product lines.
Second, although Americans enjoy analyzing the impact of limited hemodialysis in the U.K., "What is most interesting, politically . . . is what has not happened.
Age Concern, the nation's principal organization representing the aged in health matters, conceded, 'we haven't taken the issue up'" (Halper 1985: 44) . Thus a treatment differential between the two countries exists. The U.K. has a lower cutoff age for hemodialysis, but a higher rate of home treatment and transplantation. The treatment differentials are related to many factors, not the least of which is the difference in financial incentives and the differences related to diffusion of technology.
Intensive care units. "The intensive care unit (ICU) is at the heart of the controversy over rationing or withholding of 'beneficial' medical services. In the United States, each ICU bed-day costs an average of three to four times more than a routine hospital bed-day. The ICU takes 14% to 20% of the American Hospital budget-or $14 to $20 billion a year, 1% of this country's GNP" (Strosberg and Fein 1987) . None of the rationed services identified by Aaron and Schwartz had the financial magnitude of the differential of ICU beds. Specifically, they postulated that it would cost the British $1,365 million (in 1980 dollars) to bring their number of ICU beds up to the U.S. level (Aaron and Schwartz 1984: 75) . But why would the British want to bring their ICU beds up to the U. S . level?
The findings of Hennings et al. (1987) on the utilization of ICU resources are fairly typical of the American studies conducted: "Currently, as many as 45% of all ICU patients are admitted because they may be at risk for medical or postoperative complications. However, less than one-third of such patients and only a minority of our patients, who entered for hemodynamic monitoring, actually require therapeutic interventions ." The authors concluded, as have other researchers, "Our observations, therefore, raise important questions regarding the current organization of ICUs and the most cost-effective method of operation. Based on the results of this study, we suggest that alternative organization of ICUs be considered ."
The National Institutes of Health consensus conference statement on critical care medicine reported that "For the most part, there exists only empiric evidence that intensive, coronary or critical care units result in a decrease in mortality or mor-bidity. The overall impact of intensive care services on survival is not clear" (Parrillo 1984: 278) . A Brookings Institution policy development seminar in 1986 on rationing medical care for the critically ill was partly stimulated by the fact that "the viability of every ICU in the United States is now threatened by rapidly changing reimbursement systems" (Strosberg and Fein 1987: 4) . The budget constraints in the U.S. have placed managers in a situation similar to that faced by U.K. administrators, forcing them to decrease resources in the intensive care units given that their cost-effectiveness is negligible. However, given the lack of sufficient data on their contribution to reducing morbidity or mortality, this transition in the U. S .
may not be bad for patient care or the budget.
Can the differential in ICU beds between the two countries be explained? In addition to the cost-effectiveness question, there are several other possible explanations. Hospital services in the U.K. are grouped in order to minimize duplication; hospital wards specialize in the patients they receive. Forecasting demand centrally may thus be more accurate. Nationalized services allows for rationalized additionddeletions of ICU beds based upon projected demand rather than duplication of beds and other intensive care services by competing hospitals. Also, specialist consultants become highly expert in the U.K. Perhaps they have marginally fewer postoperative patients than their counterparts in the U.S. Finally, as with dialysis, there is no explicit policy on intensive care units in the U.K. Instead, managers chose to make decisions, given specific budget constraints, to maximize health status changes relative to inputs. After all, ICUs clearly are not a good investment with regard to cost-benefit analysis of health care services. However, in the United States, hospital administrators had a financial incentive to classify some beds as ICU because of attempts to control the cost of routine services for Medicare patients. ICU beds were classified as nonroutine, so by describing beds as ICU there was a financial advantage, even if there was no medical advantage, in overproviding such facilities.
X-rays, Might there be reasons other than rationing that the British perform about half as many x-ray examinations per capita and use one-fourth the film as the U.S.? First, why only half the x-rays per examination? Do different sorts of accidents and illness occur in the two populations? The slight differences in accident and illness incidence could not account for such a large x-ray differential.
Litigation levels might be a better explanatory factor of the x-ray differential. Aaron and Schwartz (1984: 108) observe that between 1947 and 1972, only 2,809 malpractice claims were made in the U.K., compared to one and a half times that figure on a per capita basis in the U.S. Litigation is costly in the U.K. to the plaintiff, who must pay his lawyer a predetermined fee to initiate a suit. In the U.S., most malpractice cases are handled on a contingency basis. If the plaintiff in the U.K. loses, he must also pay the defendant's legal costs. Perhaps it is not that health care in the U.S. is too expensive, but that litigation is too easy and cheap.
Why would there be only half the number of x-rays taken for each patient? Aaron and Schwartz do not mention that the differential may be attributed to radiologic skill. British radiology technicians may take better x-rays the first time. Film usage rates are monitored in a general way, and silver reclamation is carried out, so radiographers are not encouraged to be profligate. Before the fact that rationing is occurring is accepted, a controlled comparison of British and U. S . radiographers and an assessment of the standards of clarity demanded by the radiologists should be conducted. It may be necessary to investigate whether any parties have a financial incentive to encourage high numbers of x-rays to be taken, e.g., incentives based on the units of work a radiology department produces.
CAT scanners. Comparing CAT scanners per million population between the two countries has been of much less interest than comparing the rate of adoption in the U.S. of CAT scanners and MRI scanners. Introduced in the United States in 1973, 921 CAT scanners were operating by the end of 1977 (Hillman 1986 ). In comparison, only about 100 MRI scanners were operating after four years. This difference in technology diffusion is related to the minimal improvement of MRI over existing technology, differences in regulation, and incentives for providers. As Steinberg et al. (1985) stated:
Historically, methods of payment for medical care in the United States have stimulated the development and use of sophisticated and expensive technologic methods, with little consideration given to efficiency and cost effectiveness. Our analysis suggests that, to the extent that an exciting new technique such as MR imaging is a bellwether, this historical pattern may be changing.
Thus, because of new financial incentives, the rate of adopting new technology in the U.S. has slowed. However, although Americans call a slow rate of technology diffusion "rationing" in the U.K. and are amazed that the British do not protest, it is apparent that the rate of adoption of new technology in the United States is also slowing and that the U.S. population is not protesting loudly either. Instead, the U.S. protests focus on the high costs of care. The American Board of Family Practice survey also asked respondents, "What should be done to lower health care costs?" Seventy percent responded that price controls should be established. When asked what should be done to improve health care delivery systems, the same group gave as their number one response "Lower the cost of diagnostic tests and medicine."
In April 1987, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) and the American College of Physicians (ACP) issued guidelines for the appropriate ordering of the fifteen most common categories of diagnostic tests. "The diagnostic testing guidelines will eventually become part of the payment policy for Blues plans. . . . BCBSA and ACP representatives said implementation of the guidelines will reduce health care costs significantly" (AHA 1987) . These guidelines, the fourth in a series from BCBSA's Medical Necessity Program, are expected to increase the quality of care while reducing health care costs. As BCBSA president Bernard Tresnowski stated, "The estimates as to how many of these ($30 billion a year) tests are unnecessary range from twenty percent to sixty percent. If these estimates are accurate, we are spending $6 billion to $18 billion a year on procedures which do not aid in the diagnosis or treatment of illness." In fact, "All evidence to date indicates we have succeeded in proving the quality care is also cost-effective care" (ibid: 8). BCBSA argues that defensive medicine, fueled by the malpractice crisis, has contributed to this test abuse. Regardless of the source, one of the most prominent national health care organizations, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of America, is now establishing guidelines to limit diagnostic testing, asserting that it will not only reduce costs but increase quality. Isn't this reduction in access the same rational utilization of resources that is called rationing when it is done by the British?
Consider what Aaron and Schwartz readily admit: the shortages in the U.K. are not pervasive, people are not driven to seek outside care, and demand to develop such facilities is minimal. If there is no demand and no perceived deprivation, is it meaningful to talk of rationing in the way Aaron and Schwartz, and other commentators, do? It does have a rhetorical quality. Talk of rationing in the U.K. helps to divert attention from the rationing-by-price system in the U.S. which is disastrous to the 37 million uninsured and underinsured. While Americans focus on denying hemodialysis to patients over 65 years old, the British are equally dismayed by a system that does not insure minimal health care coverage (e.g., vaccinations, casts for broken limbs, access to a doctor, and prescriptions) to 37 million Americans.
As Merrill and Cohen (1987) admit, the pervasive attitude that the British ration medical care services and Americans do not serves to focus public attention on a straw man. They argue that Americans should focus on assuring a minimum level of care for all rather than on evaluating differential access to tertiary care services that do not decrease morbidity or mortality.
Myth three: NHS patients have long waiting times
The competitive market, guided by the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith, is the basis for most economic activities. However, because some countries have decided that inability to pay should not limit access to medical care, other methods of payment and/or provision of services have been established. When financial barriers to service are eliminated, other resource allocators, such as time, serve to constrain the use of resources. Thus, economists are interested in patient waiting times because of the notion of nonmonetary costs determining resource utilization.
Waiting for care can be measured and defined in several ways. Bloom and Fendrick (1987) decided that what was important was how many people wait, how long they wait, for what type of care they wait, what their diagnosis is, and what some of the likely effects of waiting are. As they indicated, "The real concern with queues is determining who is on the list, why and what happens to the patient over time" (ibid.: 132) . This, of course, is much more complex than it appears.
Waiting can occur at many stages of the health care providing process. First, it can happen when the patient initially wishes to see the physician for investigations, tests, and diagnosis. Assuming the patient does not require emergency treatment, the family practitioner's office or health maintenance organization will be called for an appointment. Any delay is called waiting time for appointment. Second, when the patient arrives at the emergency room, physician's office, or a clinic, there may be a discrepancy between time of arrival or appointment and time seen by the physician. This is called clinic waiting time. Third, if the patient requires referral to a specialist for further investigations or treatment, referral waiting time may occur. Finally, once the primary physician or specialist recommends a course of treatment, a delay may occur because of the lack of availability of facilities to the patient. This treatment waiting time may be because of excess demandhnderprovision of facilities or because of an inability to pay.
Clinic waiting time is liable to occur several times in a treatment cycle, and will be measured in minutes and hours. The other sorts of waiting times are liable to range from hours to months. Some waiting time may be a good thing because too much intervention too soon may be harmful and more conservative approaches are desirable.
Waiting time for appointment. Anyone wishing to use the NHS, which means virtually the entire population of the U.K., must be enrolled with a primary care physician known as a family practitioner or, most commonly, a general practitioner (GP). The GP controls access to the community and hospital health services and to controlled drugs. He is the gatekeeper of the NHS , except for emergency patients admitted via accident and emergency departments. The GP makes the initial diagnosis and prescribes treatment. There is a fundamental difference in physician organization with the U.K. and the U.S. In the U.K., GPs do not usually practice a hospital-based specialty or have access to hospital facilities. Some may be employed part-time as venereologists, anesthesiologists, accident and emergency officers, psychiatrists, or dermatologists; some may be able to refer patients for xrays or rehabilitation services without going through a specialist; and a few may have one or two beds in a local community hospital; but these cases are not typical. It is extremely rare for a GP to carry out any surgery but the most minor. If so, the surgery would be performed in his or her own clinic or health center, not in the hospital.
What can the NHS GP do for the patient? First, laboratory tests and samples may be needed. If a preliminary diagnosis can be made, then the GP can offer counseling and advice about treating the condition and can prescribe drugs or other medication which the patient obtains from a pharmacy. The GP can also mobilize support for the patient in terms of surgical appliances, ambulances, community nurses, and social workers. Alternatively, if the diagnosis is problematic, or the treatment is of a more specialized nature, the GP will make a referral to a hospitalbased consultant or specialist. Usually each larger town has a district general hospital (DGH)-which may be one large new hospital or several older ones at various sites-in which all the major specialties are represented, with anything from one to a dozen or so consultants for each specialty. The specialist or consultant will then take over clinical management of the patient, as far as that condition is concerned, and when the course of treatment is complete will send his report to the GP about what has occurred and what might occur in the future.
Everyone is entitled to enroll with a GP, and must do so if they wish to gain access to the system (although a nonenrolled accident victim would simply be admitted by a hospital; enrollment is merely a practical necessity). The sick patient will contact his GP, who will decide whether to make a home visit or request the patient to attend his or her surgery. Home visits are still common, and most GPs will make several each day, but the vast majority of patients are seen in surgery. A receptionist will generally handle the appointment system, and GPs organize surgeries as they wish. Delays in seeing the GP at this stage typically vary from "Come down immediately" to "The earliest appointment is next week." Some GPs accept walk-in cases, and some will have an early morning surgery where no appointment is necessary.
How does this compare to the United States? Newhouse et al. (1981) reported that data from the RAND Study indicated that patients waited over three weeks to see their family physician in one rural area; the average waiting time in the Seattle area to see the family physician was seven days. A study published by the U.S. National Center for Health Services Research in March 1981 reported on findings from a study of 14,000 households during 1977-1978, which found that "during the period from January 1 to March 31, 1977, the average wait for an appointment in ambulatory care settings was 7.0 days." Waiting times in hospital outpatient departments averaged 10.1 days, whereas physician offices averaged 6.9 days. For preventative services, such as examinations, immunization shots, etc., the average wait for an appointment to see a physician (nonhospital) was 14.1 days (U.S.
DHHS 1981).
A more recent study by the University of Minnesota Center for Health Services Research (1981) compared access and utilization rates of HMO and FFS patients. No statistically significant difference was found in time spent waiting for an appointment for FFS and HMO patients. However, the average waiting time for an appointment with a family physician across all payers was just over three days.
Bloom and Fendrick studied waiting for appointment times in England in 1984 and found that patients had a mean waiting time for initial appointment of one day (Bloom and Fendrick 1987: 134) . Thus, the U.K. probably has a shorter waiting for GP appointment time than the U.S.
Clinic waiting time.
Patients waiting in emergency rooms, physician offices, and clinics may experience a delay between the scheduled appointment time and time actually seen by the physician. Neither the U.K. nor the U.S. has a regular system to collect data and monitor this variable.
However, one of this article's authors was engaged in a comprehensive study of the outpatient clinics of the teaching hospitals in a major British city in March 1978. For two weeks every patient was given a card that recorded time of arrival, time of appointment, time of any tests, time of seeing physician, and time of departure. The response rate was 77.9 percent, or 7,936 attendances of the clinics sampled. Overall, 31.9 percent of patients were seen within 15 minutes of appointment time, 44.8 percent within 30 minutes, 60.8 percent within 45 minutes, 73.7 percent within 60 minutes, and 88.4 percent within 90 minutes. The clinic "did not attend" (DNA) rate ranged from 6.3 percent to 34.5 percent, with a mean of 20.3 percent. Some specific clinics had even higher rates. Similarly, 31.3 percent of the patients arrived late for appointments, although over half of these arrived with 15 minutes.
The same NCHSR study of 14,000 households reported a mean waiting time for all patients in a physician's office was 29.4 minutes, in a hospital outpatient department 45.3 minutes, and in a hospital emergency room 38.2 minutes. Patients with appointments waited less than walk-ins (27.9 minutes in physician offices, but 46.6 minutes in hospital OPDs). Waiting times varied by region and racial type (U.S. DHHS 1981).
The results of these two studies conducted at comparable time frames show remarkably similar results. Again it appears that the myth of long waiting lines is unsubstantiated.
Referral waiting time.
How long does it take to see a specialist? Here is where the U.K. and U.S. differ considerably. In Britain, the GP writes to the specialist, giving an outline of the condition and requesting that he or she examine the patient (hence the term "consultant"). The case will be classified as urgent or nonurgent. Eventually the patient will be given an appointment to see the specialist.
If the GP recognizes that immediate care is required, the patient can be sent straight to the hospital, or the specialist can be called. In severe cases, the patient may be admitted immediately. Generally, however, the patient's case joins a file of similar referrals from all over the locality. The consultant or one of the consultant's senior staff prioritize the referrals into urgent and nonurgent. The consultant's assessment depends on his previous experience with the GP (some call everything urgent, according to hospital staff) and his knowledge of the condition in question. Within the urgenunonurgent categories, appointments will be given on a first-come, first-served basis, and clinics will usually include a mixture of recent "urgents" and longstanding "nonurgents ."
In the study conducted by Bloom and Fendrick, the median waiting time for outpatient specialists ranged from 14 days to 84 days, depending on the specialty. Patients referred to gynecologists and internists had the shortest wait (two weeks), whereas patients waited nearly nine weeks to see plastic surgeons and orthopedic surgeons. The median waiting time for all specialists was 56 days (Bloom and Fendrick 1987: 134) . Despite the lack of comparable U.S. data, it seems fair to assume that British patients wait much longer to see specialists, or consultants, than Americans.
Treutment waiting time.
Even being seen by a consultant and agreeing on an appropriate treatment regime does not mean that delays are over. If tests or treatments are required which entail hospitalization, then further waiting may occur unless it is urgently required to save the patient's life. It is at this stage that British patients may decide to pay for a private operation, although only 13 percent actually do so (Williams et al. 1981) .
Bloom and Fendrick's study is of benefit here in separating myth from reality: "It must be emphasized that not everyone waits for admission to hospitals in Britain. Only about one-fourth of all patients were placed on a waiting list prior to admission, determined by physician and based on diagnosis and severity" (Bloom and Fendrick 1987: 135) . For all specialties, the median waiting time for those on the waiting list was 39 days. However, the concern is probably not the waiting list time but rather the large variance. It should be noted that the longest wait (80 days) was in the specialty with the highest rate of elective procedures (plastic surgery) and the shortest wait was in the specialty requiring the most immediate attention to patient needs (pulmonology). Bloom and Fendrick conclude, "The widely accepted notion that a large majority of hospitalized patients wait a long time for care in Britain is mistaken. The emphasis on primary ambulatory care means that essentially no one has to wait for general practitioner care" (ibid.: 1987: 131) . Thus, the British are more likely to wait for hospitalization, while Americans are more likely to wait for an initial appointment with their family doctor. Which is more important? However, some U.S . citizens do not have health care insurance or the means to pay for treatment. Others may be refused treatment because they are presumed credit risks. Facilities may be available for a test or procedure, but the patient may have to postpone purchase indefinitely. Should this delay be built into the waiting time averages? Its exclusion makes the figures in the NHS look worse by comparison, but hides an important difference. True comparisons would be obtained only by randomly selecting matched samples of households in the U.S. and the U.K. and comparing access as well as waiting times.
Myth four: There is no free choice of health provider in the NHS
During seminars in which doctoral students in health services administration had to research various countries' health care systems and describe them to their peers, the authors noted that the American students all raised an issue in which the foreigners present showed no interest-whether or not patients had free choice of physician. Often the comment was, "I was unable to find out whether there is free choice of physician." Evidently their source authors had not considered this a significant issue either. This particular preoccupation among the students echoed one of the first questions Americans in general ask about the NHS. One of the "myths" about the NHS is that Americans have a free choice of physician (and this is positively valued) whereas in the NHS one must accept the physician assigned.
Choice of physician is a strong American value. This in itself is surprising because it has long been recognized that the patient has no real way of determining the quality of the medical services received (Blendon and Altman 1986). Even fellow professionals are unlikely to testify against a negligent colleague, so any choice must be based on superficial issues and hearsay. When analyzed, the freedom to chose any physician may not amount to very much, although it does ensure that one can escape the clutches of the grossly negligent, exploitive, or ill-mannered physician and that a second opinion is easily obtainable.
To what extent is there free choice in the British NHS? Once again, several different areas must be differentiated where choice may be exercised although the main distinction is between primary services provided by general practitioners and secondary and tertiary services provided in hospitals.
Generalpractitioner services. Four services are provided by the NHS through private professional practitioners, who through various ways are reimbursed by the government for their services. Opticians (nonmedically qualified) test eyes and provide spectacles, and can refer to ophthalmologists if they detect any ophthalmic irregularity. Patients have free choice in selecting an optician. Usually the patient has a free eye test under the NHS, but ends up paying for frames and lenses privately because there is a limited choice of styles among the subsidized ones.
Patients also have free choice of pharmacists when obtaining prescription drugs under the NHS. With some exceptions (such as school children, pregnant mothers, and senior citizens), a nominal price for a prescription is charged. (Only 13-15 percent of the population actually pay even this nominal fee, despite the outcry when the fee is raised.) Again, the patient is free to choose any dental practitioner for each episode of treatment for a nominal charge. A dentist must submit a report to a review panel for some high-cost work before it can be carried out under the NHS (e.g., the use of gold for fillings). If the panel of dentists believes that the work is unwarranted, permission can be denied and the patient must decide whether to accept private care, or, in this case, receive only a silver amalgum filling. Similarly, any dental patient receiving NHS care can be called to undergo an examination to ensure that their dentist did the work and did it properly. Dentists are reimbursed a standard rate for their work. The rates are renegotiated by the government and the dental profession annually. Dentists themselves continually argue that the rates are too low, and it costs money, as well as hassles, to provide NHS care. For this reason many dentists refuse to provide it. In fact, technically, patients must emphasize that they require NHS treatment when they visit the dentist, even when they have previously received such treatment from that same dentist (who they probably think of as their regular family dentist, as analogous to their physician GP). At the end of a treatment episode the patient must sign that he received the treatments for which the dentist will then reclaim his or her fees.
However, of primary interest to most Americans is the freedom to choose a family physician. As a patient moves around the U.K., he must register with the Family Practitioner Committee as a patient of Dr. X, who receives per capita reimbursement. The patient does not have to live in close proximity to his GP, but this is desirable. If the distance is too great, the patient could not expect a house call if one were ever necessary. The patient can choose his general practitioner in Britain, but the physician has the option of refusing. However, this would be rare except in the case referred to below, and there are two limitations to one's choice.
First, in order to ensure that physicians are spread evenly around the country and that physicians do not register more patients than they can reasonably expect to cover, the GP's practice size is limited. If the GP of choice is fully enrolled, the patient cannot register with the physician.
Second, once registered, the NHS patient's ability to change physicians is restricted. If the patient moves to a different location, there is no problem. But changing physicians because of a personality clash or desire for a change is discouraged. Obviously, personalities do clash, or patients feel their GP is not providing a satisfactory service, so there is some changing-often with mutual relief. But to change frequently would be discouraged. Sometimes patients can be very demanding and troublesome and no GP seems to suit them. A GP receiving a request for a transfer by a local patient may inquire as to why the patient wants to move, and decide not to accept him. If a patient cannot find a GP to accept him, the Family Practitioner Committee can assign him to a Gl?
Is there a choice of physician in the NHS? It is not total freedom, unless the patient elects for private care, but the initial choice is there just as much as in the U.S. And given the patient's difficulties in determining the quality of medical services received, many observers have suggested that the lay person's freedom to choose may not amount to very much anyway. As even fellow professionals are unlikely to draw attention to negligent colleagues, any choice must be based on superficial criteria. Secondary and tertiary care. Access to NHS treatment beyond primary care services is either through hospital emergency departments, or by referral from a GP to a specialistlconsultant. The GP typically selects a specialist who has previously seen patients promptly and given good quality service. Usually the specialist will be in the local district general hospital, but referrals to the regional university teaching hospital or specialist hospital are not uncommon.
How much choice does the patient have of hospital? Less in practice than in theory. In theory the patient can ask for a different specialist than the GP suggests or, having seen one, can request a second opinion. The GP may acquiesce, or may take the line that he or she is in a better position to judge a specialist's ability. It depends on the GP, the patient, and the circumstances (e.g., the patient's previous experience with that specialist). If the preferred specialist has long waiting lists or tends to regard that GP's referrals as nonurgent, the patient has no real choice.
Similarly, it is a national service, and in theory any GP can refer to any consultant, however prestigious. But in practice GPs tend to be parochial in outlook, as do patients. The central government has recently encouraged GPs to use computers to track where they could send patients to minimize waiting. Unfortunately, the same government's financial controls are causing many health authorities to try to recharge the patient's local authority for such services. So the traditional option of mobility within a national service is in practice under threat.
Thus, patients are not forced to accept a particular specialist, but in practice most patients get the one their GP contacts. Even then, a junior doctor (registrar or house officer) is likely to provide much of the actual treatment under the specialist's supervision. This is inevitable because of the organization and training of specialists in the U.K. And perhaps that is why choice is not such a big issue for patients in the U.K.
Other services provided by the NHS, either in hospitals or in the community, involve many other professionals: nurses, social workers, chiropodists, physical therapists, ambulance personnel, etc. The patient has virtually no personal choice in these areas, although a clear clash of personalities between a patient and a professional would probably lead to another professional being assigned. However, American patients have no more freedom of choice than their British counterparts in terms of hospital auxiliary and nursing personnel.
Myth five: Private medicine is taking over
Private hospitals and nursing homes in Britain tend to be specially designed to attract patients, and are more similar to U.S. hospitals than to NHS hospitals. The private sector is growing. The "myth" is that it is flourishing because the British public is voting with its feet and abandoning the NHS. This is not true.
Although private insurance enrollment rose significantly through the 1970s, the total percentage of insured persons in 1987 is still only 5 million (including de-pendents) , or about 10 percent of the population. The percentage of the total British physician and hospital expenditure which is private is currently about 5 percent (Rayner 1987) . Most primary and follow-up care and virtually all tertiary care is given by the NHS. If any postoperative disaster occurred in a private hospital, Aaron and Schwartz report that the patient would be transferred to a NHS facility. So what services are being provided privately? Mainly elective routine surgery for which there are currently long NHS waiting lists, or where the patient requires a private room and one is unavailable in the local NHS hospitals (Financial Times 1983; The Director 1983) .
Why did enrollments in private sector schemes rise as they did? In 1955, about half a million people had private insurance. By 1960 this number had doubled; it reached two million by 1970. Then it doubled again. But it can be argued that this was not in fact a response by consumers demanding private care.
The 1970s were a time of economic difficulties, marked by government controls on pay. One ploy used by employers, therefore, was to offer fringe benefits such as private insurance. Employees do not refuse such benefits even though they may not actively seek them. Having received them as benefits, many enrollees began to make use of their policies. As a result, in 1981 the British United Provident Association (BUPA), which at the time issued about three-quarters of all private health insurance policies in the U.K., lost nearly $3 million. Premiums rose up to 30 percent and employers began to be more unwilling to offer this particular fringe benefit, so the growth of the private sector slowed. BUPA's losses were due to several reasons: patients with lower incomes, who tended to have poorer health, became subscribers (the NHS is unsuccessful in leveling out health status across socioeconomic classes); demand by enrollees increased in response to NHS waiting lists and as subscribers received better information about their coverage; and hospital costs rose.
Although it is difficult to accurately assess the utilization of private medicine as statistics are not gathered, most experts agree that the growth of the private sector is slowing. As Klein indicates, the ideological questions related to private medicine are not whether it is taking over the NHS but the relative degree of substitutability or supplementation of the NHS by private medicine (Klein 1979) .
Conclusion
These myths commonly held by Americans about the British NHS prevent recognition of some strengths of the NHS that provide advantages to the U.K. citizen. First, there is the issue of system costs. British and American authors both write that their respective systems are replete with administrative waste and mismanagement. Nonetheless, such allegations aside, "Health care costs account for nearly 11% of the gross national product in the United States but only 6% in Great Britain" (Himmelstein and Wollhandler 1986 ), Himmelstein and Wollhandler calculated the potential savings in administrative costs in the United States by pro-jecting the proportion of spending for administration in the U.K. to health expenditures in the U.S.: "Instituting a national health service like that in Great Britain could save $38.4 billion-10.1% of the total spent for health care" (ibid.: 443).
The fact that the U.K. is about to spend half as much as the United States and yet have comparable mortality and morbidity rates is impressive. "Before the introduction of universal free access to care in Great Britain, the age-adjusted mortality rates were higher than those in the United States. Within a decade of the introduction of free access, a sharp decline in mortality occurred, so that the current levels in Great Britain are slightly lower than those in the United States" (ibid.: 444). As Lister (1986) pointed out, "The argument for increased funding for the NHS is weakened by the absence among developed countries of any observable association between the resources allocated to health care and the population's standards of health. Thus, life expectancy and infant mortality are almost identical in Britain and the United States."
Aside from the specific cost-benefit analysis, are there other advantages of the British NHS? One American physician who practiced in Britain for a few years observed, "British support services are prevalent. Day centers and luncheon clubs for the elderly and the mentally ill are exemplary and effective. There are many types of home health visitors, child health and geriatric visitors, psychiatric visiting nurses and midwives who make home visits. General practitioners make house calls whenever patients need them. Prescriptions are free for children under the age of sixteen, and adults pay a token fee" (Dotterer 1986 ). The British have long been proponents of home care: "Public policies have repeatedly been given priority to the provision of services in the community and home to the elderly and others" (Zwick 1985) . Zwick (1985) also identified seven specific lessons that Americans can learn from the British experience with home health services, not the least of which are increased patient satisfaction and decreased system costs.
The decreased availability of high-technology services can improve health care. For example, the lower rate of inpatient hemodialysis is offset by a higher rate of kidney transplantation or home dialysis. Also , the prevention of iatrogenic illness associated with lower hospitalization rates has never been accurately measured. In sum, the British NHS does have some qualitative advantages in addition to the quantitative advantages.
However, perhaps Rudolph Klein summarized the systems best when he stated in a recent interview:
I have often argued that Britain is an "original-sin" society, where we don't believe that the world can be totally put to rights. We accept problems and are rather fatalistic about our capacity to deal with some of them. In contrast, America is a "perfectibility of man" society, where the view is that if there is a problem, you can solve it. We therefore have a contrast between a society that is terribly skeptical about its ability to solve problems and a society that sees problems as challenges. I think this explains an enormous amount of the difference between the respective health services. It explains the acceptance by British patients of waiting lists for elective services. It explains, on the other hand, the American demand that if you are ill, every possible procedure should be used. This is why, in the end, to debate whether the NHS could be adapted for America or the American system could be adapted for the U.K. is futile, because it would mean trying to transplant cultural institutions between societies with totally different patterns of cultural values (AHA 1985) .
By developing myths, Americans have limited themselves from fairly evaluating the British National Health Service. Just as Americans cannot understand limiting acute services, the British cannot understand a system where 15 percent of the population simply does not know whether they can count on receiving health care. Both health care systems are products of native values. Let us recognize that building a health care system on a foundation of cultural values focuses our vision and, at the same time, blinds us from seeing the whole picture.
